Abstract: This paper presents a design of an elliptic curve coprocessor over GF( p) with side-channel analysis countermeasures and fast implementation schemes, which can be used for all elliptic curve cryptographic algorithms, such as ECC and SM2. The proposed coprocessor can resist side channel analysis and is implemented basing on the C*Core-C0 platform. Using SMIC 0.13-µm CMOS technology, synthesis results show that our coprocessor can perform one 256-bit elliptic curve scalar multiplication over the prime field in 8.35 ms at 50 MHz with only 1.98 mW and 17.7K gates. The proposed coprocessor outperforms other coprocessors in terms of the overall performance of area, power, speed and security, which is quite suitable for smart IC card.
Introduction
Elliptic curve algorithms have been used in many practical applications, especially in smart IC card field. Since that the smart IC card has many restrictions in chip resources, area and power consumption, integrate elliptic curve coprocessors focus on promoting the calculation speed on condition of small area and low power consumption. In 1996, Kocher [1] proposed the concept of timing attack. Then he proposed power analysis for smart IC card [2] . During these years, side channel attacks and countermeasures have been hotspots in researches of cryptographic algorithms.
A complete elliptic curve cryptosystem is always divided into protocol layer, elliptic curve layer and finite field layer [3] . Elliptic curve coprocessor consists of the elliptic curve layer and the finite field layer and is very flexible. Users are able to choose different protocols to meet the practical need of different coprocessors. The elliptic curve layer contains elliptic curve scalar multiplication (ECSM), point doubling, point addition and some other assistant functions. The finite field layer contains basic arithmetic modules, such as modular multiplication (MM), addition, subtraction, etc.
In this paper, we realize an elliptic curve coprocessor over GFðpÞ for smart IC card, which contains multiple side-channel analysis countermeasures. The hardware part consists of modules of fixed-curve point doubling, non-fixed-curve point doubling, fixed point addition, non-fixed point addition, infield, quitfield, modular inversion, MM, addition and subtraction. Meanwhile, the software part contains fixed point ECSM and non-fixed point ECSM, hash, check point on curve and generating random numbers. The coprocessor has been simulated on C Ã Core-C0 platform and fabricated with 0.13-µm CMOS technology. Synthesis results and security verification show that our coprocessor has good performance and security. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews basics of elliptic curve cryptography, side channel analysis and existing countermeasures. Section 3 presents the system design methodology of our coprocessor. Implementation, verification and analysis are illustrated in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper.
Past work
This section introduces background knowledge about elliptic curve arithmetic formulas and conventional side channel attack methods. In addition, some countermeasures against side channel analysis are also presented.
Elliptic curve cryptography
Elliptic curves can be divided into prime and binary field. We mainly focus on the prime field. Elliptic curve of the prime field is defined as follows:
Parameter a and b are constant, x; yGFðpÞ. If elliptic curve point P ¼ ðx 1 ; y 1 Þ ≠ 1, then ÀP ¼ ðx 1 ; Ày 1 Þ. Suppose another point Q ¼ ðx 2 ; y 2 Þ ≠ 1 and
Point doubling and point addition of affine coordinates involve modular inversion. However, getting modular inversion consumes much time, which can be solved by transforming the elliptic curve into projective coordinates. Traditional projective coordinates include standard projective coordinate, Jacobi projective coordinate and mixed Jacobi-affine coordinate. Point doubling under Jacobi coordinate and point addition under mixed Jacobi-affine coordinate require minimum operations. Thus, we adopt point doubling of Jacobi coordinate and point addition of mixed Jacobi-affine coordinate. However, point addition of mixed Jacobi-affine coordinate demands that one point must be fixed, we use point addition of Jacobi coordinate when the two points are both non-fixed.
Side channel analysis
Side channel analysis mainly includes power attack, fault attack (FA) and electromagnetic attack (EMA) [4] , among which power attack is the most important. Power attack can derive the secret key utilizing power leakages of cryptosystems. When circuits are working, power consumptions will dynamically change. Since the working pattern is related to the secret key, attackers can do attacks with the relevance. FA firstly injects glitches into cryptosystems. Then it analyzes wrong ciphertexts and obtains the secret key. In terms of elliptic curves, there are three types of FA, differential fault analysis (DFA), safe-error based analysis, weak-curve based analysis. EMA has similar principles with power attack except that it analyzes electromagnetic radiation of cryptosystems instead of the power consumption leakage.
Traditional power attack methods consist of Simple Power Attack (SPA), Differential Power Attack (DPA) and Template Attack (TA) [4] . SPA just needs one power trace. In elliptic curve algorithms, ECSM is executed as a sequence of point doubling and point addition. As the order is determined by the secret key, attackers can distinguish it by analyzing the pattern of power trace and deduce the secret key. DPA and TA are more complex. DPA utilizes the coherence between the secret key and intermediate variables, then retrieve the key bit by bit. TA firstly should construct a set of power trace templates with fixed keys set by attackers. Then real power traces with secret key will be collected to make comparison with templates. According to the similarity between them, the secret key can be confirmed.
Countermeasures against side channel analysis
Traditionally, people use the binary expansion algorithm to implement ECSM, which is described in Algorithm 1. In order to resist attacks, lots of countermeasures have been proposed. Coron [5] came up with a double-and-add always algorithm to resist SPA. As Algorithm 2 shows, it adds redundant operations to make sure no matter d i is 0 or 1, once point doubling and point addition would be performed. Thus, power traces have regular pattern and the secret key is secure. However, this algorithm cannot resist other kinds of attacks and consume much time. Later, many other kinds of countermeasures have been put forward one after another, such as Montgomery powering ladder, randomized scalar split, scalar randomization, base point blinding, randomized projective coordinates, etc. Each one can resist different attacks and has its own strength and weakness. Some countermeasures can be combined to enhance security, but not all countermeasures can be integrated together simply. Choosing countermeasures should consider overall conditions about security, area, timing and so on.
3 System design of coprocessor 3.1 System architecture In order to save chip area and power consumption, functions are divided into several levels. Fig. 1 shows the system architecture.
All main functions are listed from bottom to top as follows: i. Hardware arithmetic functions:
Algorithm 1 Binary expansion Algorithm 2 Double-and-add always In the following, main functions of the system are described. It is worth mentioning that two types of point addition and point doubling were realized. Fixed point addition is used when the point in ECSM is fixed while the non-fixed point addition is adopted when the point in ECSM is changing. For SM2, as parameters of elliptic curve are defined, point doubling can be optimized and fixedcurve point doubling is implemented. Meanwhile, non-fixed-curve point doubling is designed for general elliptic curves.
Main functions design 3.2.1 Elliptic curve scalar multiplication
Since that ECSM contains many times of point doubling and point addition, it consumes the longest time in elliptic curve algorithms and determines the speed. Many fast ECSM algorithms have been proposed to reduce time, such as binary extension, NAF window, fixed base window and fixed base comb. Here we choose the Initialized Masking Scalar Multiplication (IMSM) [6] , which is based on the fixed base comb method and makes some improvement to resist DPA. However, it needs a pre-table and does not suit for non-fixed point ECSM. So we modify Montgomery powering ladder for non-fixed point ECSM. The Montgomery powering ladder adopts a point R to mask intermediate values. R changes into 3R or À3R randomly at the end of each ECSM in order to resist the doubling attack [7] . Algorithm 3 Modified Montgomery Powering Ladder Input: An integer d ! 1 and points P; R; S such that S ¼ dR. Output: dP. 1: Q 1 ( P and Q 2 ( R 2 In order to resist DFA, CheckPointOnCurve is designed to verify whether initial and result points of ECSM are on the curve. Attackers cannot inject faults and it can resist DFA.
Infield and quitfield
This part includes Montgomery/Jacobi infield and Jacobi Montgomery quitfield. Point doubling and point addition are based on MM. In various kinds of MM algorithms, Montgomery modular multiplication (MMM) is the most efficient as it eliminates the division operation. This paper adopts MMM and Jacobi coordinate, in which data should be transformed into Montgomery field and Jacobi field at the beginning while final results should be transformed from Jacobi Montgomery field to normal. Table I shows the infield and quitfield process, in which MMMðA; BÞ ¼ A Á B Á R À1 (R ¼ 2 n modp, n is the length of elliptic curve, p is the big prime number). In fixed point ECSM, as initial points are stored in registers, they could be transformed into Montgomery field before operations in order to save time. Thus, because of the random element, so it can resist TA. Besides, the random element can randomize electromagnetic information to some extent. As EMA is quite similar to power analysis, it can resist differential electromagnetic attack (DEMA) and template electromagnetic attack (TEMA) as well.
Modular inversion
There are three usual kinds of modular inversion algorithms. The first one is based on Fermat theorem, the second one is based on Euclid's theorem and the last one is Montgomery modular inversion. Although the first is easy, its calculation speed is rather slow. The second needs several times of judgement each cycle and is not suit for operations under Montgomery field. Therefore, we choose Montgomery modular inversion. Firstly, we calculate a À1 2 k ðmod pÞ (a is the number to be mod, n k 2n, n is the bit length of elliptic curve), then calculate a À1 2 n ðmod pÞ. The finite state machine (FSM) is as Fig. 2 shows. When the system command is MODINV, modular inversion will be performed and return a finish signal.
Implementation and verification

System implementation
In order to reduce area and power consumption, we combine software and hardware together and establish communication between CPU and hardware circuits through AMBA bus. The system is based on a 32 bits embedded processor platform C Ã Core-C0. Fig. 3 shows architecture of the whole system.
The working principle of system is as follows. CPU emits enable signal, then transfers it through the advanced high-performance bus (AHB) to the ECC software 
Hardware modules implementation and synthesis
We choose 256 bit standard parameters in the prime field of SM2 and simulate with Modelsim SE 6.5. Using 32 bit data to control registers to perform different functions. More experiments have been done to make sure all hardware modules are functional.
With SMIC 0.13-µm synthesis library, we synthesis hardware modules with Design Compiler and PT Compiler of Synopsys. Comparing with existing elliptic curve cryptographic coprocessors, results are as Table II shows. When working at the frequency of 50 MHz, our coprocessor just has 17.7K gates and consumes 1.98 mW. Its area and power are far less than former coprocessors. The critical path of our coprocessor is 11.57 ns and the maximum working frequency is 86.4 MHz. It is quite suitable for the small area, low power and endurable speed requirements of smart IC card. Apparently, only a few researches of elliptic curve coprocessor took countermeasures against side channel analysis into consideration. [13] can resist timing attacks and several power attacks. [11] can resist SPA. Although they require less cycles than our scheme, the gate count of [13] is 10 times of ours while [11] is 30 times. They cannot be used in area constrained circumstances. [8] and [10] also consume less cycles, but their synthesis areas are too large and they have no countermeasures. [9] is designed for high frequency applications and cannot be used in smart IC cards. [12] has less gates, but it is still two times of ours and isn't as good as ours in other aspects. Fig. 4 shows our coprocessor has the lowest AT. Therefore, our scheme has minimum gates, low power and high security. Comparing with schemes with the same logic gate magnitude, its speed is rather fast as well. 
Verification and analysis
After sufficient simulation, our ECC coprocessor is fabricated using SMIC 0.13-µm CMOS technology, with the die shown in Fig. 5 . Package the chip into dual interface smart IC card. Then test functions and security of it. Functional tests consist of fixed point ECSM and non-fixed point ECSM. We control PC to send APDU command to the card through the card reader and read the result back to make sure functions are all right. As Fig. 6 shows, the chip test platform consists of PC, converter, card reader, differential probe and oscilloscope. The converter can educe the working current of the chip. There is a resistor on the converter, whose voltage can be acquired to simulate the power of the chip.
Firstly, we verify the security of fixed point ECSM. Acquire a power trace of fixed point ECSM and amplify middle part of it as Fig. 7 shows. Owing to IMSM algorithm, 256bit fixed point ECSM is transformed into 64 loops. Each loop consists of one PDOUBLE0 and one PADD0. No matter what the scalar group is, one PADD0 will be performed. Thus attackers cannot deduce the scalar and the fixed point ECSM can resist SPA successfully. Then consider the security of non-fixed point ECSM. Collect power traces of non-fixed point ECSM and amplify middle part as Fig. 8 shows. Non-fixed point ECSM adopts the modified Montgomery Powering Ladder algorithm. It consists of 256 groups of PDOUBLE0 and PADD1. As the secret scalar is unrelated to the operational order of PDOUBLE0 and PADD1, attackers cannot deduce the secret scalar according to one power trace. Thus the non-fixed point ECSM can resist SPA as well.
The non-fixed point ECSM is used in the condition that the scalar is fixed and point is non-fixed, which might be vulnerable to DPA. Supposing that attackers know the algorithm in non-fixed point ECSM is Montgomery powering ladder. Set the initial point Q 1 ¼ P, Q 2 ¼ 2P, and the highest bit of secret scalar d nÀ1 ¼ 1 as default. Conduct DPA test from d nÀ2 bit by bit downwards. Theoretically, if
It can be easily seen that points involved in point doubling is related to the value of secret scalar. If it can be judged that the first point doubling is related to P, then d nÀ2 ¼ 0. If the first point doubling is related to 2P, then d nÀ2 ¼ 1. Select 10000 groups of P, calculate 2P, choose the lower 32 bit of P and 2P, then analyze the correlation with power traces according to the hamming weight model. Correlation results are shown as Fig. 9 shows.
Owing to the masked point R, the DPA result shows that P and 2P has no correlation with power traces, which matches the theoretical analysis. Thus the nonfixed point ECSM can resist DPA. DPA results also demonstrate intermediate variables have been successfully masked. So templates cannot be built to do TA. In other words, the non-fixed point ECSM can resist TA. 
Conclusion
This paper utilizes co-design of software and hardware and completely implements an elliptic curve coprocessor of GFðpÞ with countermeasures against side channel attacks and fast scheme. Sufficient verification and security analysis have been performed. The proposed coprocessor can be used in smart IC card for the design of elliptic curve cryptographic algorithms. Using SMIC 0.13-µm technology, our coprocessor can perform one 256-bit elliptic curve scalar multiplication in 8.35 ms at 50 MHz with only 1.98 mW and 17.7K gates. Compared with former coprocessors, it shows great promotion in aspects of area, power, and can resist several kinds of side channel attacks.
